Abstract: This paper investigates government subsidy policies and develops three duopoly models: anarchic subsidies,consumer-oriented subsidies,and platform-focused subsidies.It delves into the quality level,pricing strategies,and the influence of these subsidies on platform strategic decisions within the industrial Internet landscape.Through case analyses,it scrutinizes how platform quality level and pricing respond to varying subsidy levels across different policy scenarios,and assesses the subsequent impact on platform profitability.Additionally,it conducts an in-depth examination of social welfare.The research demonstrates that government subsidies effectively enhance platform quality.Notably,when governments subsidize consumers,platforms with advanced IT capabilities tend to set higher prices,while platforms with weaker technology adopt the opposite strategy.For technology-leading platforms,lower consumer subsidies result in increased profits,while platform subsidies boost overall profitability.However,platforms with inferior technology only experience improved profitability with higher government subsidies.Social welfare exhibits a non-linear trend,increasing with escalating government subsidies,highlighting the positive impact of these policies.In summary,this study explores government subsidies' role in enhancing platform quality and profitability while positively influencing social welfare.

Key words: government subsidy, industrial internet platforms, platform quality, pricing

摘要： 研究政府补贴政策,构建了三种双寡头垄断模型,分别对应着无政府补贴、基于消费者补贴以及基于平台补贴的情景。在此基础上,深入探讨了工业互联网平台的质量水平、定价策略,以及不同补贴政策对平台策略决策的影响。通过案例分析,比较了在不同补贴政策下,平台的质量水平和定价随着补贴水平的变化情况,以及补贴水平对平台利润的影响,同时还对社会福利进行了深入剖析。研究结果表明,政府对平台的补贴政策能够有效地提升平台的质量水平。特别地,当政府选择补贴消费者时,具备卓越IT技术实力的平台倾向于设定更高的价格,而对于技术较为薄弱的平台则呈现截然相反的趋势。对于处于技术领先地位的平台,政府补贴水平较低时,选择补贴消费者可以为平台带来更多的利润;反之,政府补贴平台则有助于提升平台的盈利水平。然而,对于技术相对劣势的平台而言,只有在政府补贴水平较高时,平台的盈利才会随着补贴水平的提高而增加。社会福利水平则呈现出一个非单调的趋势,随着政府补贴水平的递增,社会福利水平逐渐上升,突显了政府补贴政策对社会福利的积极影响。

关键词: 政府补贴, 工业互联网平台, 平台质量, 定价策略