Abstract: In the context of unequal Low-Carbon Supply Chain (LCSC) power structures and Low-Carbon Policies (LCPs),to promote firms to actively reduce emissions and help the government formulate appropriate LCPs,it is necessary to explore the internal relation between LCSC power structures and different LCPs.Based on subsidy and carbon tax policy,the Stackelberg game models with manufacturer leading and retailer leading were constructed respectively to study LCSC carbon emission reduction and pricing decisions in different situations.The main research results were as follows:① under the subsidy policy,if Consumer Environmental Awareness (CEA) was relatively small,the power structure of retailers could enhance the positive effects of subsidies on Carbon Emissions Reduction (CER) and firms'profit;if CEA was relatively large,the power structure of retailers was only detrimental to manufacturers.② under the carbon tax policy,which power structure could reduce (enhance) the negative (positive) impact of the carbon tax on CER and retailers'profit depended on the Initial Carbon Emissions (ICE);for manufacturers,the power structure of retailers could not only alleviate the negative impact of carbon tax on their profit,but also enable carbon tax to increase their profit;under the two power structures,the maximum CER efficiency of the subsidy policy was the same,while the maximum CER efficiency of the carbon tax policy was higher under the retailer power structure.③ under the manufacturer's power structure,the subsidy policy had more advantages over the carbon tax policy for environment,consumers and LCSC under certain conditions;under the leadership of retailers,two different LCPs might be better,depending on the ICE and subsidy intensity.

Key words: government subsidy policy, carbon tax policy, power structure, carbon emission reduction

摘要： 在权力结构不对等和低碳政策背景下,为促进企业积极减排,并帮助政府制定合适的碳减排政策,有必要探究低碳供应链权力结构与政府不同碳政策之间的内在联系。因此,基于补贴和碳税政策,分别构建制造商主导和零售商主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究不同情形下的低碳供应链减排决策问题。研究表明:①当政府实施补贴政策时,如果消费者环保意识较弱,零售商权力结构能增强补贴对碳减排、企业（制造商和零售商）利润的积极效果;如果消费者环保意识较强,零售商权力结构仅对制造商不利。②当政府实施碳税政策时,何种权力结构能降低（增强）碳税对碳减排和零售商利润的负面（正面）影响,取决于初始单位碳排放量大小;对制造商而言,零售商权力结构不仅可以减轻碳税对利润的负面影响,还能使碳税增加其利润。此外,补贴政策的最大减排效率与权力结构无关,而碳税政策的最大减排效率在零售商权力结构下更高。③在制造商主导下,当满足一定条件时,与碳税政策相比,补贴政策对环境、消费者和低碳供应链整体来说更具优势;但在零售商主导下,两种不同的碳政策都存在效果更佳的可能性,这取决于初始单位碳排放量和补贴力度。

关键词: 政府补贴政策, 碳税政策, 权力结构, 减排