Abstract: Under carbon cap and trade and government subsidy,to determine the optimal price and disassembly level of products,the game models without/with product disassembly design for supply chain was constructed by considering competition,and the equilibrium solutions of the two models were obtained.Through the comparison and numerical example analysis,the results showed that the disassembly design not only improved the profit of manufacturer and remanufacturer,but also reduced the price of products.Manufacturer could not reduce the market influence of remanufacturer simply by reducing the product disassembly level,because the manufacturer should improve the product disassembly level when the sensitivity coefficient of disassembly level had more influence on the production cost of remanufactured product than that of new product.The government increased remanufacturing subsidy was not always beneficial to the development of remanufacturing industry,because when the sensitivity coefficient of disassembly level had a similar effect on the production cost of remanufactured and new products and the research and development cost coefficient of disassembly was small,increasing subsidy would reduce the demand for remanufactured products.Numerical example showed that maintaining a higher carbon trading price was beneficial to increase product price,disassembly level and profit of supply chain members.

Key words: remanufacturing supply chain, carbon cap and trade, government subsidy, product disassembly

摘要： 碳交易机制下,为确定产品最优价格和可拆卸性水平,针对考虑补贴且制造商和再制造商存在竞争的供应链,构建了制造商不进行/进行可拆卸性设计的博弈模型,得到了两类模型的均衡解,并进行了比较和算例分析。结果表明,制造商进行可拆卸性设计会提高供应链成员利润和降低产品价格;制造商不能单纯依靠降低可拆卸性水平来抑制再制造商发展,因为当可拆卸性水平敏感系数对再制造品生产成本的影响远大于对新品生产成本的影响时,制造商应提高产品的可拆卸性水平;政府增加再制造补贴并不总是有利于再制造产业发展,因为当可拆卸性水平敏感系数对再制造品和新品生产成本的影响较接近且可拆卸性研发成本系数较小时,增加补贴会降低再制造品需求;算例分析表明维持较高的碳交易价格有利于提高产品售价、可拆卸性水平和供应链成员利润。

关键词: 再制造供应链, 碳交易, 政府补贴, 产品可拆卸性