Abstract: To analyze the influence of different market power structure on low carbon technology innovation strategy in a supply market consisting of a low carbon product manufacturer (LM) and an ordinary product manufacturer (HM),the decision game models under three different situations,in which LM was market leader (LL),HM was market leader (HL) and no market leader (NL) were developed respectively.The results showed that the low carbon technology innovation level was negatively related to the innovation cost coefficient,and was positively related to the government subsidy;the government's innovative subsidies for manufacturers of low carbon products could share the inputs and risks of enterprises in the early stages of innovation;low carbon technology innovation level of LL mode was the best,NL mode followed and HL mode lowest;when low carbon technology innovation risk compensation was relatively large,LM should adopt active attack strategy,conversely,adopt active defense strategy;when innovation cost coefficient was lower,HM should adopt market share strategy,conversely,adopt active defense strategy.

Key words: power structure, low carbon, technology innovation strategy, government subsidy, Stackelberg game

摘要： 为了研究一个低碳产品制造商(LM)和一个普通产品制造商(HM)构成的供方市场中,不同市场权力结构对低碳技术创新策略的影响,分别构建了LM为市场主导(LL)、HM为市场主导(HL)及无市场主导(NL)模式下的决策博弈模型。研究表明,低碳技术创新水平与创新成本系数负相关,与政府补贴正相关;政府对低碳产品制造商的创新补贴能够分担企业在创新初期的投入及风险;LL模式低碳技术的创新水平最优,NL次之,HL最低;当低碳技术创新风险补偿比较大时,LM宜采用主动进攻策略,反之采用主动防守策略;当创新成本系数很低时,HM宜采用市场平分策略,反之宜采用主动防守策略。

关键词: 市场权力结构, 低碳, 技术创新策略, 政府补贴, Stackelberg博弈