Computer Integrated Manufacturing System ›› 2024, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (2): 730-743.DOI: 10.13196/j.cims.2021.0540

Previous Articles     Next Articles

Trade-old-for-remanufactured and leasing strategy selection considering consumer's psychological cost

XIE Bingqiu,LI Bangyi,CHEN Xintong   

  1. College of Economics and Management,Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
  • Online:2024-02-29 Published:2024-03-08
  • Supported by:
    Project supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,China(No.ND2023003).

考虑消费者心理成本的“以旧换再”和再制造品租赁策略

谢冰秋,李帮义,陈信同   

  1. 南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院
  • 基金资助:
    中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(ND2023003)。

Abstract: Based on Trade-Old-for-Remanufactured(TOR)and leasing,a two-stage game model of a monopolistic manufacturer was constructed.The boundary conditions of four production decisions of manufacturer were discussed.The influence of consumer's psychological cost and functional quality perception for purchasing remanufactured products on product demand,manufacturer's profit and production decisions were studied.Considering the existing fixed cost of leasing,the influence of government TOR subsidy on manufacturer's production decisions and the environmental impact under different production decisions were explored.The research showed that manufacturer's profit was positively correlated with consumer's perception of remanufactured product's function quality while negatively correlated with psychological cost;only when the psychological cost was below the threshold,the implementation of TOR was profitable;manufacturer could expand market share and obtain higher profit through leasing;manufacturer adopted leasing strategy when the psychological cost was high or government increased the subsidy when the psychological cost was low,through which economic and environmental benefits could be maximized.

Key words: trade-old-for-remanufactured, remanufactured product leasing, production decision, government subsidy, environmental impact

摘要: 考虑“以旧换再”和租赁的再制造品实现方式,构建了单个垄断制造商回收再制造的两阶段博弈模型。引入消费者购买再制造品的心理成本和功能质量认可度,研究了二者对产品需求和制造商利润、生产决策的影响,得出制造商4种生产决策的边界条件。进一步探究存在固定成本时,政府“以旧换再”补贴对制造商生产决策的影响和不同生产决策下的环境效益。研究表明,利润与功能质量认可度正相关,与心理成本负相关;心理成本低于阈值时,“以旧换再”才有利可图;制造商可以通过租赁拓展再制造品的市场份额并获取更高的收益;心理成本高时,制造商采取再制造品租赁策略可以实现经济与环境效益最优;心理成本低时,政府需加大补贴激励制造商进行“以旧换再”,以达到经济与环境效益双赢。

关键词: 以旧换再, 再制造品租赁, 生产决策, 政府补贴, 环境影响

CLC Number: