关键词: 价格随机, 双向信息不对称, 回购契约, 转移支付, 供应链协调

Abstract: The buyback contract with stochastic prices caused by emergencies can whether coordinate the supply chain or not under two-way information asymmetry was studied.An information incentive model of buyback contract with two-way information asymmetry was constructed by combining dAspromont & Gerard Varet (AGV) mechanism with buyback contract.A new kind of transfer payment in hope of ensuring the expected return of both sides was designed,as well as a set of buyback contract menu.The simulation examples were used to verify the validity and rationality of the model.The results showed that the optimal transaction volume of goods was decreased with increasing of cost information between the supplier and the seller under two-way information asymmetry.The transfer payment obtained by seller was decreased with rising cost and increased with rising cost of the supplier,while the transfer payment obtained by the supplier was increased with rising cost and decreased with rising cost of the seller.The profits of both suppliers and sellers were very close to each other under complete information symmetry.Buyback contract could coordinate supply chains with two-way information asymmetry.

Key words: stochastic price, two-way information asymmetry, buyback contract, transfer payment, supply chain coordination