关键词: 信息不对称, 损失厌恶, 广告费, 收益共享契约, 供应链协调

Abstract: To discuss the coordination of supply chain under the revenue sharing contract,a joint decision-making model of advertising investment and order quantity was designed with “Revelation Principle” under asymmetric information on retailer's loss aversion extent,focusing on the two-stage supply chain with a loss-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer.It was also compared with the joint decision-making model of centralized system and symmetric information to analyze the influence of information status,wholesale price,loss aversion extent,advertising effect factor and market price on optimal decision of supply chain and the utility of each enterprise.The above problems were verified by numerical analysis.The result showed that if the wholesale price was reduced properly,the supply chain under asymmetric information could be coordinated by revenue sharing contract.In addition to the coordination situation,the optimal joint decision of centralized system was always better than that of decentralized system.Meanwhile,the optimal order quantity,advertising investment and the overall expected utility of the supply chain under asymmetric information were always lower than that of symmetric information.In any cases,the manufacturer's expected utility was negatively related to the wholesale price.With the increase of advertising effect factors,the optimal advertising investment decreased,and the change trend was gradually flattening.

Key words: asymmetric information, loss aversion, advertising investment, revenue sharing contract, coordination of supply chain