Abstract: Based on kernel-level licensing or architecture-level licensing of technology provider,the quality and price strategies of technology-intensive supply chain considering manufacturers’ Research and Development (R&D) modes were constructed.Applying numerical examples,the impacts of competition intensity,quality cost coefficient and licensing fee on equilibrium results were analyzed.The applicability of different licensing models to the market and the boundary conditions of manufacturers’ choice of core component outsourcing or in-house R&D models were explored.The results showed that the competition and quality upgrade could promote the quality investment of technology provider;however,the increase of quality cost would motivate manufacturers to shift from quality competition to price competition,resulting in the emergence of inferior products.When the strategic manufacturer’s ability was weak,it was more profitable to adopt the outsourcing R&D;otherwise,the strategic manufacturer (M2) adopting in-house R&D could get more benefits.Under the asymmetric market structure,the two manufacturers had different strategic preferences when the licensing fee of M2 was lower.It was always better for the provider to choose the architecture-level authorization.

Key words: kernel-level authorization, architecture-level authorization, quality upgrade, in-house research and development, technology-intensive supply chain

摘要： 基于技术提供商内核层级授权或构架层级授权,构建制造商不同研发模式下的技术密集型供应链质量和价格决策模型。通过数值和算例分析,研究竞争强度、质量成本系数和许可费对均衡结果的影响,探讨不同授权模式的市场适用性以及制造商核心组件外购或自主研发模式选择的边界条件。研究表明:渠道竞争和质量升级可以促进技术提供商的质量投资,而质量成本提升会导致制造商从质量竞争转向价格竞争,降低产品质量;研发能力较弱(研发成本较高)时,策略制造商(M2)采取外购模式更优,反之,自主研发对制造商(M2)更有利;非对称市场结构下,当M2许可费较小时,两个制造商具有不同的策略偏好;对提供商而言,选择构架层级授权总是更有利。

关键词: 内核层级授权, 架构层级授权, 质量升级, 自主研发, 技术密集供应链