Abstract: To explore the impact of manufacturer's loss aversion behavior on the carbon emission reduction level and price,the Nash bargaining solution was regarded as the reference point of the manufacturer to construct Stackelberg game model with three situations of centralized decision,manufacturer rational preference decentralized decision and manufacturer loss aversion preference decentralized decision.The research showed that:a lower carbon emission reduction level of products was leaded by the loss aversion behavior of the manufacturer,and the profits of members were hurt;the impact of manufacturer's loss aversion behavior on wholesale price (retail price) was higher than retail price (wholesale price) if the manufacturer's loss aversion levels were low (high);compared with the manufacturer's rational preference decisions,if the consumer's preference for low-carbon products was low or the carbon emission reduction investment cost was high,the retailer was willing to pay for a high proportion of the Carbon Emission Reduction Investment Cost (CERIC) in the manufacturer's loss aversion preference decision,otherwise,a low proportion of CERIC was undertaken by retailers;the appropriate CERIC sharing contract could achieve Pareto improvements in profits for members.

Key words: autonomous reduction, low-carbon supply chain, loss aversion, cost sharing contract

摘要： 为探究制造商的损失厌恶行为对自主减排低碳供应链决策的影响,以Nash谈判解作为制造商的损失厌恶参考点,构建集中决策、制造商理性偏好分散决策、制造商损失厌恶偏好分散决策三种情形的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究碳减排水平与定价决策。研究表明:制造商的损失厌恶行为导致较低的产品碳减排水平,且制造商的损失厌恶行为不但损害零售商的利润,而且更损害了自己的利润。当制造商的损失厌恶偏好程度较小时,损失厌恶行为对批发价格影响更为显著;反之,对零售价格影响更为显著。与制造商理性偏好决策相比较,制造商损失厌恶偏好下,若消费者对低碳产品的偏好较小或碳减排投资成本较大,零售商愿意承担的碳减排投资成本比例较大;否则,零售商愿意承担的比例较小。适当的碳减排投资成本分担契约能够实现制造商与零售商利润的Pareto改进。

关键词: 自主减排, 低碳供应链, 损失厌恶, 成本分担契约