关键词: 不确定需求, 闭环供应链, 奖惩机制, 协调契约, 博弈模型

Abstract: To study the effect of premium and penalty mechanism on decision of member enterprises, and to coordinate the Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) under premium and penalty mechanism, a CLSC game model which composed of a single manufacturer, a single retailer and a single third-party collector with premium and penalty mechanism under uncertain demand was constructed. The study results showed that the return rate, order quality, retailer and third-party collector expected profits were all increased and the retail prices were all decreased under premium and penalty mechanism for centralized and for decentralized decision-making, but all these decision variables and profits were not relevant with recovery setting. Manufacturer's profit was affected on the lowest level of return rate and the extent of premium and penalty. Channel efficiency was decreased with the increasing of the lowest return rate and the extent of premium and penalty. In addition, the system profit in decentralized decision-making was less than that in centralized decision-making, thus a modified two-part pricing contract and income-cost sharing contract were presented to coordinate the closed-loop chain, but the coordination performance of two-part pricing contract was better than income-cost sharing contract.

Key words: uncertain demand, closed-loop supply chain, premium and penalty mechanism, coordination contract, game model