关键词: 环境性能, 再制造能力, 闭环供应链, 讨价还价, 协调, 责任延伸制度

Abstract: To research the bargaining coordination strategy of closed-loop supply chain,by considering the environmental performance and the remanufacturability of products at the same time,a closed-loop supply chain model with a manufacturer,a retailer and customers was established,and the equilibrium solution under centralized and decentralized decision-making model was respectively studied.The influence of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) policy parameters on environmental performance,remanufacturability and participants profits was examined.The Nash bargaining game model and Rubinstein bargaining game model were designed to realize supply chain coordination.The research showed that the manufacturers were more willing to design products with high environmental performance and low remanufacturability when the production environment cost and garbage disposal cost increase.The increase of remanufacturing environmental costs and environmental costs would encourage manufacturers to design products with high environmental performance and high remanufacturability.The share of environmental cost undertaken by customer not only affected the customer's own profits,but also affected the profits of manufacturer and retailer.The Nash bargaining model and Rubinstein bargaining model could both realize supply chain coordination in the bargaining model with coordinate supply chain.When the bargaining power of the parties involved in the negotiations was equal,the Nash bargaining model should be choosed to coordinate supply chain.If the bargaining power of the negotiators was very different and the discount rates of retailers and customers were higher,the Rubinstein bargaining model could be used to coordinate supply chain.

Key words: environmental performance, remanufacturability, closed-loop supply chain, bargaining, coordination, extended producer responsibility policy