关键词: 闭环供应链, Stackelberg博弈, 回收率奖惩, 产能约束, 合作策略

Abstract: To study the influence of government recycling rate reward and punishment intervention on manufacturer's cooperation strategy in the closed-loop supply chain with capacity constraints,a  closed-loop supply chain model consisting of a manufacturer,a retailer and a recycler was constructed,and  Stackelberg game theory was applied to analyze.The study showed that the manufacturers preferred to cooperate with recyclers when the government's rewards and punishments coefficient were large;conversely,manufacturers' cooperative tendencies were related to the size of production capacity.In addition,the increase in reward and punishment coefficient would weaken the impact of changes in production capacity on the relationship between decision-making variables such as the recovery rate under different cooperation models,and would aggravate or mitigate the negative impact of different cooperation models on the consumption surplus under certain production capacity conditions at the same time.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, Stackelberg game, recovery rate reward and punishment mechanism, capacity constraints, cooperation strategy