Abstract: Aiming at the channel conflict and low drop-shipping logistics service lever problems in retail drop-shipping double channel supply chain,the drop-shipping dual channel supply chain decision under traditional wholesale price contract was analyzed with dynamic game theory,and the fact that the running condition of wholesale price contract was logistics service demand elasticity less than a certain threshold was found,at which the retailer only provided the lowest logistics service level in industry.Further,the logistics investment subsidies were introduced into the supply chain,and the result showed that the investment subsidies contract's feasible interval was bigger compared with the wholesale price contract.The drop-shipping logistics service lever would be higher,and the drop-shipping logistics charge,the market prices of two channels would also be increase,eventually the profits of manufacturers and retailers would be improved.Therefore,the logistics service level would get a better incentive and the effect of supply chain coordination was better under the investment subsidies contract.

Key words: retailer, dual channel, drop-shipping, logistics service, investment subsidy, supply chains

摘要： 针对双渠道零售商代发货供应链中存在的渠道冲突和代发货物流服务水平低下的问题,运用动态博弈理论,对传统批发价契约下的代发货双渠道供应链决策进行了分析,发现批发价契约运行的条件是物流服务需求弹性小于某阈值,此时零售商仅能提供行业最低物流服务水平。进一步将物流投资补贴引入供应链,研究发现：相比批发价契约,投资补贴契约的可行区间更大,代发货物流服务水平将更高,代发货物流服务费、两个渠道的市场价格等也将提高,最终提高制造商和零售商的利润。因此,投资补贴契约下的物流服务水平将得到更好的激励,供应链协调的效果更好。

关键词: 零售商, 双渠道, 代发货, 物流服务, 投资补贴, 供应链