›› 2021, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (3): 954-964.DOI: 10.13196/j.cims.2021.03.026
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陈建华1,2,梅俊晓1+,曹菁菁1,2
基金资助:
Abstract: To research the optimal channel selection problem for closed-loop supply chain with dominant retailer under premium and penalty mechanism and dual-channel sales,four hybrid recycling models with multi-channel recycling were constructed by using game theory.Under four different hybrid recycling models,the profits of closed-loop supply chain members and the whole system as well as its recovery level were compared.The results showed that in a closed-loop supply chain with dominant retailer,when the quotient of recycling price coefficient and competition coefficient of recycling channel was small,the hybrid recycling mode of the manufacturer and the third-party recycler was a best strategy to manufacturer,and the supply chain was unstable at this time;on the contrary,the hybrid recycling model of the manufacturer,the retailer and the third-party recycler was a best strategy to manufacturer and other members of the whole system,where the supply chain had long-term stability.Unit reward factor and the channel of sale didn’t affect the optimal recycling channel decision of each member of the supply chain.
Key words: dominant-retailer, closed-loop supply chain, premium and penalty mechanism, hybrid recycling, channel selection
摘要: 为研究奖惩机制下零售商主导闭环供应链中各参与主体的回收渠道最优决策问题,运用博弈论建立4种奖惩机制下具有竞争性的双渠道销售和多渠道回收闭环供应链模型,对比分析了4种混合回收模式下供应链成员利润、整个供应链系统的利润和回收水平。研究表明:废旧产品回收价格系数与回收渠道竞争系数之比较小时,制造商会选择制造商和第三方回收商这一混合回收渠道,此时供应链存在不稳定性;反之,制造商会选择制造商、零售商和第三方回收商这一混合回收渠道,此时供应链具有长期稳定性。单位奖惩因子和销售渠道模式不影响供应链各成员的最优回收渠道决策。
关键词: 零售商主导, 闭环供应链, 奖惩机制, 混合回收, 渠道选择
CLC Number:
F224.32
陈建华,梅俊晓,曹菁菁. 零售商主导闭环供应链混合回收渠道选择决策[J]. 计算机集成制造系统, 2021, 27(3): 954-964.
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URL: http://www.cims-journal.cn/EN/10.13196/j.cims.2021.03.026
http://www.cims-journal.cn/EN/Y2021/V27/I3/954