Abstract: For exploring the effect of online review factors and premium-penalty mechanism on operational strategies in supply chain,the two Stcakelberg game models were established in non-premium-penalty mechanism and in premium-penalty mechanism respectively.The impact of online review factors including unit logistics utility and unit distance cost and premium-penalty factor on equilibrium decisions and profits was analyzed,and the effectiveness of premium-penalty mechanism was demonstrated.The results showed that the unit logistics utility could always improve the pricing of supply chain members regardless of the premium-penalty mechanism.In premium-penalty mechanism,not only the prices and logistics service quality were higher,but the profits and average value of online evaluation were further improved.However,the effectiveness of the premium-penalty mechanism depended on the logistics service quality threshold,which was enhanced with the increase in unit logistics utility and premium-penalty degree.

Key words: online review, logistics service quality, consumer preference, consumer surplus, premium-penalty mechanism, supply chains

摘要： 为探究在线评价因素和奖惩机制对供应链运营策略的影响,分别在无在线评价奖惩机制与存在在线评价奖惩机制中,利用Stackelberg博弈模型分析了单位物流效用、单位距离成本等在线评价因素与奖惩因子对供应链成员的决策、利润影响,并探讨了在线评价奖惩机制的有效性。结果表明,无论奖惩机制是否存在,单位物流效用总是能提高供应链成员的定价。奖惩机制下,不但价格与物流服务质量会更高,而且成员的利润与在线评价均值均增加。而奖惩机制的有效性依赖于随着单位物流效用和奖惩力度的增加而增强的物流服务质量阈值。

关键词: 在线评价, 物流服务质量, 消费者偏好, 消费者剩余, 奖惩机制, 供应链