Abstract: For the information screening inlong-term cooperation of supply chain,the dynamic incentive of supply chain under information asymmetry was studied.A two-stage supply chain model was built,and the contract group of product quality with transfer payment was set by brand.Through three screening models with different separation rhythms,the impact of agents' information disclosure speed on the brand and the supply chain was analyzed.The results showed that the brand was inclined to separate agents earlier,and the semi-separated contract was beneficial for the brand to control the speed of information disclosure more flexibly,which could get more profits from the retailer.From the perspective of the supply chain,it was also possible to prefer the mixed contract.Under certain conditions,the pooling contract could also increase the profits of supply chain and improve the allocation efficiency of supply chain.

Key words: screening, separation rhythms, contract, asymmetric information, principal-agent, supply chains

摘要： 针对供应链多阶段合作中存在的信息甄别问题,研究了信息不对称情况下的供应链动态激励问题;又由于在供应链长期合作中涉及信息披露的节奏问题,以往文献较少提及。针对上述问题,构建了一个二级供应链模型,品牌商制定产品质量及转移支付的合约组合,通过3种不同分离节奏的信息甄别模型,分析了经销商信息披露的速度对品牌商以及供应链系统收益的影响。研究发现,品牌商倾向于较早地分离经销商,半分离合约有利于品牌商更灵活地控制经销商的分离速率,更大限度地侵占经销商的收益,从而获取更高的收益;而系统也可能偏好混同合约,在一定条件下,混同合约也能增加整个供应链整体的利润,提升供应链整体的配置效率。

关键词: 信息甄别, 分离节奏, 合约, 信息不对称, 委托代理, 供应链