Abstract: Considering the uncertainty of market demand,a Stackelberg game model was established in the trade-in closed-loop supply chain with a manufacturer as the leader and a retailer as the follower.Analysis models were constructed from the two dimensions of risk aversion and trade-in service provider to study the impact of the decision-makers' risk aversion level on the choice of trade-in strategy.The study showed that in the case of risk neutrality,the manufacturer and retailer were more inclined to undertake the trade-in service by themselves separately,but after considering their risk aversion,the manufacturer's optimal strategy of trade-in would change from bearing by itself to outsourcing to the retailer with the increase of risk aversion coefficient.In addition,the more volatile the replacement market demand,the greater the strategic space of the retailer for trade-in,while the increase of remanufacturing surplus was conducive to expand the strategic space of the manufacturer for trade-in.

Key words: trade-in, risk aversion, closed-loop supply chain, game theory, mean-variance theory

摘要： 考虑市场需求的不确定性,在以制造商为领导者、零售商为追随者的以旧换新闭环供应链中建立Stackelberg博弈模型,从风险规避者、以旧换新服务提供者两个维度构建多个分析模型,研究决策主体的风险规避水平对以旧换新策略选择的影响。研究表明:在风险中性的情况下,制造商和零售商都更倾向于由自身承担以旧换新服务,但考虑两者的风险规避心理后,制造商的以旧换新最优策略会随风险厌恶系数的提高从自身承担转变为外包给零售商。另外,置换消费者市场需求波动性的提高会扩大零售商以旧换新的策略空间,而再制造盈余的提高有利于扩大制造商以旧换新的策略空间。

关键词: 以旧换新, 风险规避, 闭环供应链, 博弈论, 均值方差理论