Abstract: To study the influence of carbon tax,low-carbon preference and capacity constraint on carbon emissions,a two-echelon supply chain game model consisting of duopoly manufacturers and retailers was established.Stackelberg theory was used to analyze the effects of low-carbon preference and carbon tax on new/remanufactured product pricing and emission reduction decisions under capacity constraints under three different decentralized decisions.A new coordination mechanism was designed to improve the efficiency of supply chain.The results showed that under capacity constraints,the Carbon Emission Reduction(CER)behavior of manufacturers could be promoted effectively by both low-carbon preference and carbon tax policy,but the members'pricing strategies were also improved;manufacturers would always improve the carbon emission reduction of their products when the capacity increased,and the direction of price strategy adjustment was determined according to the emission reduction cost coefficient;the carbon emission reduction of products and the overall profit were better under the centralized decision,and the coordination of supply chain could be realized through the designed coordinate cost-profit sharing contract.

Key words: carbon tax, capacity constraints, low carbon preference, coordination mechanism, remanufactured product

摘要： 为了研究碳税、低碳偏好和产能约束对碳减排的影响,建立了双寡头制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链博弈模型。在分散情形下利用Stackelberg理论对比分析了3种不同决策情形来研究产能约束下低碳偏好和碳税对新/再制造产品定价、减排和利润的影响,接着以联合决策的最优解为基准设计契约来实现供应链的Pareto优化。结果表明,产能约束下的低碳偏好和碳税政策均可有效促进制造企业的碳减排行为,同时使供应链成员提高其定价策略;产能增大时,制造商总会提高其产品碳减排量,并根据减排成本系数大小决定价格策略调整方向;联合决策下的产品碳减排量和供应链整体利润更优,设计的协调费用—利润分享契约可以实现产能约束下的供应链Pareto优化。

关键词: 碳税, 产能约束, 低碳偏好, 协调契约, 再制造品