Abstract: A supply chain consisted of a supplier and a manufacturer was researched,in which the demand and cost information of manufacturer were private with high and low type.To reveal the manufacturer's true demand and cost information,the principal-agent was adopted to study the supplier's optimal price contract.The results showed that a two-part tariff contract was able to reveal the manufacturer's true information while maximizing the supplier's profit.Moreover,the two-part tariff contract changed with the ratio of the demand information variance to the manufacturer's cost information variance.When the manufacturer had the same type of cost and demand information,the supplier could determine the wholesale price depending on the sum of two kinds of information.The lowest wholesale price was offered to the low-demand low-cost manufacturers,and the highest wholesale price was offered to the high-demand high-cost manufacturers.When the manufacturer had different types of cost and demand information,the supplier could not determine its wholesale price considering only the sum of two kinds of information.A higher wholesale price was offered to the low-demand high-cost manufacturer than that offered to the high-demand low-cost manufacturer.The influence of asymmetric information of demand and cost on supplier's profit was analyzed through the numerical experiment,and the result showed that the supplier's profit decreased in the cost information variance but increased in the demand information variance.

Key words: dual-dimensional asymmetric information, supply chains, two-part tariff contract, information revelation mechanism, supplier, manufacturer

摘要： 以一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链为研究对象,其中制造商的需求和成本信息均为私有信息,且都只有高、低两类。为了揭示制造商的真实需求和成本信息,本文采用委托-代理理论研究了供应商的最优价格契约。研究结果表明,两部定价契约在揭示制造商的真实信息的同时也实现了供应商的利润最大化,而且契约的形式会随着制造商需求和成本信息差异程度比值的变化而改变。当制造商的需求和成本信息类型不同时,供应商无法依据这两类信息之和来决定批发价,其会向低需求高成本类型的制造商收取比高需求低成本类型的制造商更高的批发价。通过数值实验分析了制造商成本和需求差异程度对供应商利润的影响,实验结果表明,成本信息差异程度的增加会降低供应商利润,而需求信息差异程度的增加会提高供应商利润。

关键词: 双重信息不对称, 供应链, 两部定价契约, 信息揭示机制, 供应商, 制造商