Abstract: Owing to the situation that the partner's action could not be observed by the owner in Virtual Enterprise (VE) and they had additional private information,to ensure the project completed on time,the reasonable incentive contract must be drafted by owner to screen the true information of the partner and provide incentive to make them work hard.Aiming at the above dual information asymmetric problem,the completion time-based incentive model both considering moral hazard and adverse selection was constructed by incorporating Stackelberg game model and incentive mechanism theory.Furthermore,the corresponding optimal contract was analyzed and compared to the single information asymmetric with the only moral hazard.The comparison results showed that the owner's expected revenue was reduce,the partner's effort was reduced but the revenue was increased in dual information asymmetric situation,which reflected the value of information and its influence on the decisions and revenue of both sides.It had the reference valuable and significance to the operation of VE.

Key words: virtual enterprise, asymmetric information, adverse selection, moral hazard, incentive contract, project management

摘要： 考虑虚拟企业中盟主无法观测盟员的行动且盟员拥有私有信息这一情况,为保证项目按时完工,盟主必须制定合理的激励契约激励盟员努力工作并甄别其私有信息。针对上述双重信息非对称问题,结合Stackelberg博弈模型和激励机制理论,为盟主建立了考虑双方收益的道德风险和逆向选择并存的以项目完工时间为目标的激励模型,从而激励盟员并有效甄别其私有信息,进而分析最优契约并与仅存在道德风险的单一信息非对称情形进行了对比。结果表明,双重信息非对称时,盟主期望收益的减少,而盟员的努力程度降低且收益增加,体现了信息的价值及其对双方策略和收益的影响,对虚拟企业的运营实践有很好的参考价值和指导意义。

关键词: 虚拟企业, 信息非对称, 逆向选择, 道德风险, 激励契约, 项目管理