Abstract: In the reverse supply chain system comprised of a manufacturer and a recycler,two problems of moral hazard and adverse selection were existed for information asymmetry.To encourage the optimal effort for the recycler,the manufacturer needed to design the optimal incentive contracts.By combining with principal-agent theory and optimal control theory,the incentive contract model with continuous type of recycling operational capability under circumstance of information asymmetry was researched.When the recycling operational capability was continuous,all recyclers could choose suitable contracts according to their market situation.The influence of related parameters on incentive contracts was discussed by the models,and the influence of related parameters'changes on the expected return of manufacturer and recycler were analyzed by numerical simulation of the model with MATLAB software.

Key words: reverse supply chain, incentive contracts, principal-agent theory, optimal control theory

摘要： 在由一个制造商和一个回收商组成的逆向供应链系统中,由于信息不对称存在着道德风险和逆向选择双重问题,制造商需要设计激励契约,以激励回收商的努力水平达到最优。结合委托代理理论和最优控制理论,研究了信息不对称情况下回收商的回收运营能为连续类型的激励契约模型,发现回收运营能力为连续类型时,所有回收商均能根据自己的类型选择最适合自己的契约。通过模型讨论了相关参数对激励契约的影响,并应用MATLAB软件对模型进行了数值仿真,分析了相关参数变化对制造商和回收商期望收益的影响。

关键词: 逆向供应链, 激励契约, 委托代理理论, 最优控制理论