计算机集成制造系统 ›› 2018, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (第6): 1568-1578.DOI: 10.13196/j.cims.2018.6.025

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政府与电子产品逆向供应链激励契约设计

胡强1,曹柬2,周根贵2,江潇1   

  1. 1.上海财经大学浙江学院
    2.浙江工业大学经贸管理学院
  • 出版日期:2018-06-30 发布日期:2018-06-30
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172182,71371169,U1509220);国家社会科学基金资助项目(18BGL184);浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LY18G020020);浙江省教育厅科研项目资助项目(Y201738269);上海财经大学浙江学院发展基金资助项目。

Incentive contract mechanism between government and electronic product reverse supply chain

  • Online:2018-06-30 Published:2018-06-30
  • Supported by:
    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation,China (No.71172182,71371169,U1509220),the  National Social Science Foundation,China (No18BGL184) the Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation,China(No.LY18G020020),the Scientific Research Foundation of Zhejiang Provincial Education Department,China(No.Y201738269),and the Development Foundation of Zhejiang College of Shanghai University of Finance & Economics,China.

摘要: 针对中国电子产品再制造产业发展初期的现实国情,以制造商和回收处理商组成的逆向供应链为研究对象,基于逆向选择和道德风险问题并存的状况,设计了政府与制造商、政府与回收处理商两种激励契约。分别给出了两种契约实现正向激励的前提条件和企业类型要求,讨论了企业类型与政府契约间的关系,分析了各相关参数对两种契约设计及企业努力水平选择的影响,讨论了企业期望收益与各相关参数间的关系,通过算例详细分析了各相关因素变化对政府期望收益的影响。研究表明:政府的两种契约能有效甄别企业类型,提高企业再制造和回收处理的努力水平,实现高效度激励,政府的激励契约对促进再制造产业发展具有重要作用。研究结论为政府运作性条例的制定和逆向供应链不同成员企业的运营决策提供了科学依据。

关键词: 不对称信息, 激励机制, 回收再制造, 政府补贴, 逆向供应链, 契约设计

Abstract: For the current situations of China's electronics industry remanufacturing,by taking reverse supply chain composed of manufacturers and recovery processor as objective,two incentive mechanisms between government and manufacturers and between government and recovery processor were researched under the conditions of adverse selection as well as moral hazard.The prerequisite and the enterprise type for implementation of government's positive incentive were provided respectively.The relationships between the enterprises type and contracts were discussed,the effects of various parameters to the contracts were analyzed,and the relationships between the various factors and the enterprises' expected profits were discussed.The influence of various factors on government's expected profits were analyzed in detail by numerical simulation.The results indicated that effective incentive contract could help the government to overcome the adverse selection problem and achieve the type screening,as well as to improve the enterprise's effort-extent.The conclusions were helpful to the design of government's environmental policy and the operation of reverse supply chain in the early stage of remanufacturing industry's development.

Key words: asymmetric information, incentive mechanism, remanufacturing, government subsidy, reverse supply chain, contract design

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