关键词: 逆向供应链, 激励契约, 委托代理理论, 最优控制理论

Abstract: In the reverse supply chain system comprised of a manufacturer and a recycler,two problems of moral hazard and adverse selection were existed for information asymmetry.To encourage the optimal effort for the recycler,the manufacturer needed to design the optimal incentive contracts.By combining with principal-agent theory and optimal control theory,the incentive contract model with continuous type of recycling operational capability under circumstance of information asymmetry was researched.When the recycling operational capability was continuous,all recyclers could choose suitable contracts according to their market situation.The influence of related parameters on incentive contracts was discussed by the models,and the influence of related parameters'changes on the expected return of manufacturer and recycler were analyzed by numerical simulation of the model with MATLAB software.

Key words: reverse supply chain, incentive contracts, principal-agent theory, optimal control theory