关键词: 虚拟企业, 信息非对称, 逆向选择, 道德风险, 激励契约, 项目管理

Abstract: Owing to the situation that the partner's action could not be observed by the owner in Virtual Enterprise (VE) and they had additional private information,to ensure the project completed on time,the reasonable incentive contract must be drafted by owner to screen the true information of the partner and provide incentive to make them work hard.Aiming at the above dual information asymmetric problem,the completion time-based incentive model both considering moral hazard and adverse selection was constructed by incorporating Stackelberg game model and incentive mechanism theory.Furthermore,the corresponding optimal contract was analyzed and compared to the single information asymmetric with the only moral hazard.The comparison results showed that the owner's expected revenue was reduce,the partner's effort was reduced but the revenue was increased in dual information asymmetric situation,which reflected the value of information and its influence on the decisions and revenue of both sides.It had the reference valuable and significance to the operation of VE.

Key words: virtual enterprise, asymmetric information, adverse selection, moral hazard, incentive contract, project management