关键词: 绿色制造水平, 隐匿信息, 基金征收, 激励契约, 生产者延伸责任

Abstract: Aiming at the problem of adverse selection caused by manufacturer's green manufacturing level and the problem of moral hazard caused by manufacturer's effort level,the incentive contract between the manufacturer and the government,which was implemented in collection fund for the disposal of waste electrical and electronic products was designed with the incentive theory of motivation.The screening contract and the pooling contract were given,and the prerequisites for implementation of both contracts were proposed respectively.The incentive effects of the two types of contracts were compared.The influences of various correlative factors on two contracts were discussed.The type of manufacturer that could get the information rent was proposed.More discussion was conducted to investigate the relationships between various factors and the contractual parties' expected profits with a numerical simulation.The results indicated that the proposed screening contract was effective to achieve the manufacturers' type screening and the high-validity motivation,and the pooling contract had no incentive for manufacturers.The conclusions were helpful for the making of government's environmental regulations and the manufacturer's green development strategy.

Key words: green manufacturing level, hidden information, fund collection, incentive mechanism, extended producer responsibility