制造商风险规避下闭环供应链专利授权经营策略

doi:10.13196/j.cims.2014.03.gaopeng.0680.9.20140325

计算机集成制造系统 ›› 2014, Vol. 20 ›› Issue (3): 680-.DOI: 10.13196/j.cims.2014.03.gaopeng.0680.9.20140325

制造商风险规避下闭环供应链专利授权经营策略

高鹏¹,聂佳佳²,谢忠秋¹

1.江苏理工学院商学院
2.西南交通大学经济管理学院

出版日期:2014-03-31 发布日期:2014-03-31
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71101120,71101055,71103149);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(10YJC630183);中央高校基本科研业务专项资助项目(SWJTU11BR059)。

Patent authorization strategy of closed-loop supply chain under manufacturer risk aversion

Online:2014-03-31 Published:2014-03-31
Supported by:
Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation,China(No.71101120,71101055,71103149),the Humanities and Social Science Research Foundation of Ministry of Education,China(No.10YJC630183),and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Centrial Universities,China(No.SWJTU11BR059).

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为解决制造商风险规避特性可能引起的闭环供应链效用损失,利用博弈论研究了由一风险规避型制造商及一风险中性经销商构成的专利授权型二级闭环供应链系统。进行了制造商风险规避度及市场不确定性对零售价、回收价、专利许可费及各方效用的灵敏度分析,比较研究了不同决策模型对供应链各方效用的影响,并利用利润共享费用共担机制进行了供应链协调。研究表明:制造商对两市场风险感知的增大有利于提升各自市场的期望销售量,降低单位专利许可费,增加经销商的期望利润和供应链总效用;集中决策下的零售价、回收价以及供应链总效用均优于分散决策;由于制造商风险规避特性的存在,供应链仅能实现效用的帕累托改进而无法完全协调。

关键词: 风险规避, 专利许可, 闭环供应链, 协作机制, 博弈论

Abstract: To solve the loss of closed-loop supply chain effectiveness caused by manufacturer risk aversion,the two-level closed loop supply chain system constructed by one risk-aversion manufacturer and one risk-neutral dealer was studied based on game theory.The sensitivity analysis of manufacturer's risk aversion and market uncertainty to retail price,recovery price,patent licensing fees and the parties utility was conducted.The influence of different decision-making model on each supply chain party's utility was compared,and the supply chain was coordinated by revenue and expense sharing mechanism.The research showed that the increased risk perception for two markets of manufacturer could improve the expected sales of each market,reduce the unit patent licensing fees and increase the dealer's expected profit and total utility of supply chain.The retail price,recovery price and total utility of supply chain in the centralized decision model were better than the decentralized decision model.Due to the manufacturer risk aversion,the supply chain only could achieve Pareto improvement but not fully coordinate.

Key words: risk aversion, patent license, closed loop supply chain, coordination mechanism, game theory

中图分类号:

F273.7

高鹏,聂佳佳,谢忠秋. 制造商风险规避下闭环供应链专利授权经营策略[J]. 计算机集成制造系统, 2014, 20(3): 680-.

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制造商风险规避下闭环供应链专利授权经营策略

Patent authorization strategy of closed-loop supply chain under manufacturer risk aversion

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