Abstract: Aiming at the problem of bilateral innovation information asymmetry,an innovative incentive mechanism model based on principal-agent theory was established.The impact of innovation level,product innovation utility and supplier-retained revenue on the setting of various parameters in incentive mechanism provided by manufacturer was analyzed.The research showed that the innovation degree of both parties in the supply chain was related to the incentive coefficient and product innovation utility,and the setting of the incentive coefficient was related to the innovation investment cost coefficient of both parties.The optimal fixed payment received by the supplier was always less than its own retained revenue and would increase as the retained revenue increase.

Key words: bilateral innovation information asymmetry, innovation incentive mechanism, principal-agent theory, product innovation utility, supply chains

摘要： 针对供应链双边创新信息不对称的问题,建立了基于委托代理理论的创新激励机制模型,并分析了创新程度、产品创新效用、供应商保留收益对制造商设计激励机制的影响。研究发现,双方创新程度的大小与激励系数、产品创新效用均相关;激励系数的设定与创新投资成本系数相关;供应商获得的最优固定支付始终小于自身保留收益,而且随保留收益的增加而增加。

关键词: 双边创新信息不对称, 创新激励机制, 委托代理理论, 产品创新效用, 供应链