Abstract: To discuss the coordination of supply chain under the revenue sharing contract,a joint decision-making model of advertising investment and order quantity was designed with “Revelation Principle” under asymmetric information on retailer's loss aversion extent,focusing on the two-stage supply chain with a loss-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer.It was also compared with the joint decision-making model of centralized system and symmetric information to analyze the influence of information status,wholesale price,loss aversion extent,advertising effect factor and market price on optimal decision of supply chain and the utility of each enterprise.The above problems were verified by numerical analysis.The result showed that if the wholesale price was reduced properly,the supply chain under asymmetric information could be coordinated by revenue sharing contract.In addition to the coordination situation,the optimal joint decision of centralized system was always better than that of decentralized system.Meanwhile,the optimal order quantity,advertising investment and the overall expected utility of the supply chain under asymmetric information were always lower than that of symmetric information.In any cases,the manufacturer's expected utility was negatively related to the wholesale price.With the increase of advertising effect factors,the optimal advertising investment decreased,and the change trend was gradually flattening.

Key words: asymmetric information, loss aversion, advertising investment, revenue sharing contract, coordination of supply chain

摘要： 为解决广告效应下零售商损失厌恶程度为不对称信息的供应链协调问题,运用“显示机理”构建信息不对称下供应链广告费及订货量联合决策模型,探讨收益共享契约下的供应链协调情况,并与集中决策及信息对称的模型进行对比,分析信息状态、批发价、损失厌恶程度、广告效应因子、市场价对供应链最优决策和各企业节点效用的影响。最后,采用数值分析法对上述问题进行验证。研究结果表明：若适当减小批发价,则收益共享契约能够协调信息不对称下的供应链;除协调的情况外,集中决策下的最优联合决策总优于分散决策,信息不对称时的最优订货量、广告费和供应链整体期望效用总小于信息对称时;无论在何种信息状态下,制造商期望效用与批发价负相关;随着广告效应因子的增加,最优广告费将减小,且变化趋势逐渐平缓。

关键词: 信息不对称, 损失厌恶, 广告费, 收益共享契约, 供应链协调