关键词: 收益控制权, 供应链, 委托代理, 激励机制, 契约

Abstract: To improve operation performance of supply chain, the principal-agent relationships between enterprises in a production-supply-sales supply chain involving a producer, a wholesaler, and a retailer was analyzed. From the perspective of benefit disposal right, a principal-agent incentive contract model was constructed. Based on this model, the optimal incentive contracts under symmetric and asymmetric information were obtained. The benefit disposal right was an important factor to coordinate the revenue of the principal and that of the agents. By means of the optimal incentive contracts, scope of the optimal benefit disposal right of both the principal and the agents were determined. Enterprises in the supply chain could maximize their expected benefit utility via the optimal incentive and the optimal benefit disposal right, thus the operation capability and performance of the production-supply-sales supply chain were improved.

Key words: benefit disposal right, supply chains, principal-agent, incentive mechanism, contracts