• 论文 •    

物流服务供需联盟激励机制设计

闫秀霞,孙林岩   

  1. 1山东理工大学 管理学院,山东淄博255049;2西安交通大学 管理学院,陕西西安710049
  • 出版日期:2008-09-15 发布日期:2008-09-25

Incentive mechanism design for logistics service supply-demand alliances

YAN Xiu-xia, SUN Lin-yan   

  1. 1.School of Management, Shandong Technology University, Zibo 255049, China;2.School of Management, Xi′an Jiaotong University, Xi′an 710049, China
  • Online:2008-09-15 Published:2008-09-25

摘要: 在分析物流服务外包合作发展趋势的基础上,提出构建物流服务供需联盟的设想,建立了由一个物流服务供方和一个物流服务需方组成的供需联盟的质量-价格两阶段博弈模型。针对供需双方议价能力对称和非对称两种情况,分析了物流服务供方和物流服务需方的价格及利润变化。通过转让支付,设计了双方之间的激励机制。理论分析与算例研究表明,在该机制下,通过供方向需方的转让支付,可以达到双方的全面联盟,保证联盟整体利润和成员各自利润的增加,有利于物流服务联盟的稳定与发展。

关键词: 物流服务, 供需联盟, 质量—价格博弈模型, 激励机制, 转让支付, 成本利润分析

Abstract: Based on analyzing the development trend of the logistics service outsourcing co-operation, the idea of constructing a logistics service supplydemand alliances framework was proposed. A two-period quality-price game model which consisted of one logistics service provider and one logistics service demander was set up. According to the symmetric and asymmetric pricing capabilities, changes of the price and the profit for both the service provider and demander were analyzed. And based on the transfer payment, the incentive mechanism for the logistics service supply-demand alliances was established. The theoretical analysis and computation results demonstrated that under this incentive mechanism, the overall alliance (the first stage was quality alliance, the second stage was price alliance) of two parties was realized through provider to demander transfer payment, the profit increase for the alliance and the partnerships were guaranteed which were beneficial to the development and stabilization of the logistics service supply-demand alliances.

Key words: logistics service, supply-demand alliances, quality-price game model, incentive mechanism, transfer payment, cost benefit analysis

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