关键词: 供应链, 知情委托人, 选择性契约, 低信息密度最优, 事中有效

Abstract: To solve the information asymmetry of the principal in supply chain,the option contract was introduced as the principal's signal to inform the agent.By considering a two-stage supply chain consisted of one manufacturer and one retailer who had private sales ability information,the signaling model was built and the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) was analyzed.It proved that the signaling cost of principal was created by Low-Information-Intensity (LII) optimum allocation,which was the unique PBE in some conditions.Furthermore,the informed principal's interim-efficient allocation was analyzed if LII optimum was not the unique PBE,at which  Pareto-dominate (weakly) equilibrium configuration set was superior to LII.The effectiveness of proposed method was verified by  numerical examples.

Key words: supply chains, informed principal, option contract, low-information-intensity optimum, interim-efficient