Abstract: As the government and the public's emphasis on energy conservation,how to make the managers both focus on corporate profits and energy-saving problems became an urgent thing for enterprise owners.To solve this problem,a two owner-manager pairs in competition model was established.The effect of energy-saving incentive contract on enterprise,competitor's decisions and profits was analyzed,and the owners' contract strategic choice was researched.The results showed that if one of the owners provided profit contract,the other owner would better choose energy-saving contract as energy-saving contract,which could make enterprise get greater advantage in competitive market and increase energy-saving levels and profit;if both enterprise owners had the possibility to offer incentives for energy-saving,they would both do so.However,this equilibrium essentially entailed a prisoner's dilemma,in which the two firms earned lower profits compared to a situation in which the owners instructed their managers profit contracts.

Key words: duopoly competition, energy-saving incentisve contract, energy-saving levels, game theory

摘要： 随着政府和公众对节能环保的重视,如何使经理人既关注企业利润,又关注节能成为企业所有者急需解决的问题。通过建立委托—代理的双寡头竞争博弈模型,研究节能激励合同(利润与产品节能水平的加权合同)对企业和竞争对手决策和利润的影响,以及企业所有者激励合同的战略选择问题。研究发现：①如果某一企业所有者提供利润激励合同,则另一个企业所有者选择节能激励合同会更好,因为节能激励合同可以使企业在竞争中有更大优势,其节能水平和利润都能得到提高;②在纳什均衡下,两企业所有者都会向经理人提供节能激励合同,但是相较于利润激励合同,两企业的利润下降,即两者在战略选择时陷入囚徒困境。

关键词: 双寡头竞争, 节能激励合同, 节能水平, 博弈论