›› 2016, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (第7期): 1759-1767.DOI: 10.13196/j.cims.2016.07.015
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吕璞1,2,胡祥培1,马永峰3
Abstract: Under the background of gradual liberalization of rail freight rates,the problem of railway express transportation pricing decision with both allotment and spot market demand was researched.The game process of railway company and courier companies was analyzed,and the models were constructed respectively from sequential pricing and joint pricing two ways.The optimal pricing decision in these two pricing ways was analyzed and compared with each other.A method for determining the optimal level of capacity was presented in joint pricing way.The results showed that the railway company's benefit of joint pricing was higher than that of sequential pricing in most cases.Only when railway company's forecast error for spot market demand was greater than a certain threshold,the sequential pricing was better than joint pricing.With the express market uncertainty increased,the joint pricing enabled company to suffer fewer losses and higher earnings stability by comparing to sequential pricing.
Key words: transportation economy, pricing, game theory, allotment contracts market, spot market
摘要: 在铁路货运价格逐渐放开由企业自主定价的背景下,研究了高铁企业面对契约和零售双市场的高铁快递运输定价决策问题。分析了高铁企业与快递公司的博弈过程,分别就序贯定价和联合定价两种方式构建模型,分析了两种方式下铁路企业的最优定价决策并进行了比较。研究表明,大多数情况下联合定价给铁路企业带来的收益大于序贯定价,只有当高铁企业对零售市场需求预测的误差大于某一阈值时,序贯定价才优于联合定价,随着快递市场不确定性的增加,相对于序贯定价,联合定价使企业受到的损失更少,收益的稳定性更高。
关键词: 交通运输经济, 定价, 博弈论, 契约市场, 零售市场
CLC Number:
F530
吕璞,胡祥培,马永峰. 高铁快递的契约与零售双市场定价决策模型[J]. 计算机集成制造系统, 2016, 22(第7期): 1759-1767.
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URL: http://www.cims-journal.cn/EN/10.13196/j.cims.2016.07.015
http://www.cims-journal.cn/EN/Y2016/V22/I第7期/1759