Abstract: Aiming at a duopoly market which consisted of a leader manufacturing enterprise and a follower manufacturing enterprise,the mechanism of low-carbon production behavior affected by subsidy policy was analyzed systematically by constructing Stackelberg game model of those two enterprises.The research showed that the incentive effects of subsidy policy were different among different enterprises.When the subsidy intensity reached a certain threshold,the leading enterprise would take the lead in selecting low-carbon production,and the follower manufacturing enterprise would select likewise along with the subsidies further increased.When the two enterprises faced with high production cost of low-carbon products and low consumer preferences for low-carbon products,the government should give higher subsidies to low-carbon enterprises.The low carbon subsidy policy to maximize the social welfare was negatively correlated with the low carbon preferences of consumers,while was positively correlated with the low carbon emission reduction rate,the environmental benefits of low carbon products and the government's emphasis on the environment.

Key words: low-carbon manufacturing, government subsidies, duopolistic markets, game theory model

摘要： 为研究政府低碳产业补贴对处于不同市场地位的制造商低碳生产决策的影响,考察由领导型制造企业和追随型制造企业组成的双寡头市场,构建了双方的Stackelberg博弈模型。研究发现：补贴政策对不同企业低碳生产行为的激励效果不同,当补贴力度达到某一阈值后,领导型企业率先选择低碳生产,随着补贴力度的进一步提高,追随型企业也将选择低碳生产;当企业面临较高的低碳产品生产成本和较低的消费者低碳偏好时,政府应该给予低碳企业较高的补贴;实现社会福利最大化的低碳补贴政策与消费者低碳偏好负相关,而与低碳产品减排标准、低碳产品环境效益、政府对环境的重视程度等因素正相关。

关键词: 低碳生产, 补贴政策, 双寡头市场, 博弈模型