关键词: 再制造, 政府补贴, 市场进入策略, 产品质量决策

Abstract: To clarify the complex role of government subsidies for remanufacturing on the quality of remanufactured products,the game theory was used to study the market entry strategy of Independent Remanufacturer (IR) and the quality decision-making issues of Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) under government remanufacturing subsidies.Based on the analysis of consumers' choice decision,the quantitative game and quality decision models of OEM and IR were established and solved.Research showed that the market would experience three states that were complete OEM monopoly,remanufacturing threat and competition in turn with the increase of government remanufacturing subsidy coefficient.Under the remanufacturing threat condition,remanufacturing subsidies could help improve the quality and price of new products and reduce the quantity of new products.Under the competitive model,the quality and price of new products would decrease at the same time,but the demand for remanufactured products and IR's profits would improve for increasing consumer surplus.Only when government remanufacturing subsidies were at a relatively high level,IR's entry into the market would benefit the growth of social welfare.While,whether the remanufacturing subsidy policy could really reduce the environmental impact or not depended on the ratio of carbon emission amount of per unit of remanufactured product to the amount of per unit new product.

Key words: remanufacturing, government subsidy, market strategy, product quality decision