关键词: 退货管理, 逆向供应链, 不对称信息

Abstract: To promote the rapid procession of new product returns in reverse supply chain, the principal-agent problem between manufacturer and dealer was analyzed. With symmetric information, dealers'effort level reached optimal level of system, and the whole supply chain was coordinated; with asymmetric information, dealers'effort level was lower than optimal level of system, and the whole supply chain was uncoordinated. Meanwhile, dealer's effort level was positively correlated with its revenue sharing factor, which was negatively correlated with dealer's risk preference and the uncertainty of product returns, and positively correlated with dealer's processing ability of returns. With a second observable variables introduced into the linear contract, both the dealer's revenue sharing factor and its effort level were improved, and the supply chain system's incompatibility was reduced. However, the whole supply chain system was still uncoordinated. With two-factor linear contract, all agency cost of the supply chain was reduced, so the principal-agent problem between manufacturer and dealer was alleviated effectively.

Key words: returns management, reverse supply chains, asymmetric information, principal-Agent