关键词: 供应链, 双边不对称信息, 虚拟第三方, 委托代理, 纳什谈判解

Abstract: Both suppliers and retailers in a two-echelon supply chain had their own private information, and the core enterprise of supply chain as well as leading allocation of supply chain's profit was difficult to distinguish. To solve this problem, through introduction of a virtual third-party as a selfless principal, double incentives and profit distribution of supply chain with asymmetric information were proposed based on principal agent theory. Main results revealed that the expected gain requirements of supplier and retailer were obtained when double incentives was carried out with the virtual third-party on behalf of the supply chain. Furthermore, the sum total of all participants' expected revenue might be not equal or even more than the expected revenue of the whole supply chain. Based on that, reasonable distribution of the supply chain's revenue was obtained by the virtual third-party with Nash bargaining solution, and the Pareto optimal allocation plan of the supply chain's profit was obtained. A numerical analysis was given to verify the validity of the results.

Key words: supply chains, double asymmetric information, virtual-third party, principal agent, Nash bargaining solution