关键词: 供应链, 质量控制, 委托代理关系, 道德风险, 非对称信息

Abstract: Based on the principal-agent theory, the effect on supplier's quality prevention decision and buyer's quality appraisal decision under asymmetric information in supply chain was studied. Three types of moral hazards in hidden actions in node enterprises of supply chain were considered, supplier's moral hazard decision model on the conditions of quality prevention level hidden was established, buyer's moral hazard decision model on the conditions of quality inspection level hidden was set up, and the supplier's and buyer's double moral hazard decision model on the conditions of quality prevention level and quality inspection level hidden was constructed. The optimal theory was applied to solve the moral hazard value of supplier and buyer. Quantitative description of the loss of expected revenues in three types of moral hazards was presented, and a simulation analysis was performed. Finally some suggestions on quality control decision and contracts design in quality management of the supply chain under the conditions of asymmetric information were presented.

Key words: supply chains, quality control, principal-Agent relationship, moral hazard, asymmetric information