关键词: 随机产量, 供应链, 协调, 契约, Stackelberg博弈模型

Abstract: A supply chain consisting of one manufacture and one supplier was studied，in which the manufacturer was the leader with deterministic demand, the supplier was the follower with random yield. Two types of yield risks, additive and multiplicative were both considered. The optimal production problem of centralized supply chain was studied. Then, the Stackelberg game models of four contracts for the decentralized case were established, including wholesale price contract and the contracts combined with wholesale price, penalty for insufficient yield and purchase for surplus yield. By parametric analysis, it was indicated that these contracts could coordinate the supply chain of multiplicative random yield，and the corresponding analytic solution of contract parameters was obtained. For the additive random yield case, the game results showed that the supply chain couldnt be coordinated. Finally，the numeral examples verified the theoretical results and the performance of four contracts were also compared.

Key words: random yield, supply chains, coordination, contract, Stackelberg game models