• 论文 •    

模糊需求环境下供应链成员间的协调机制分析

桑圣举,张强,武建章   

  1. 北京理工大学 管理与经济学院,北京100081
  • 出版日期:2010-02-15 发布日期:2010-02-25

Coordination mechanism analysis for supply chain with fuzzy demand

SANG Sheng-ju, ZHANG Qiang, WU Jian-zhang   

  1. School of Management & Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China
  • Online:2010-02-15 Published:2010-02-25

摘要: 为保证供应链成员获得利润,在模糊需求环境下,研究由单一供应商和零售商组成的两级供应链系统的协调机制问题。将市场需求视为模糊变量,建立不确定理论下基于可信性分布的分散决策、集中决策,以及收益共享契约和回购契约模型,并以三角模糊变量为例对模型进行优化,给出各种模型下的最优策略。最后,通过数值算例对模型中的参数进行求解,并对分析结论进行验证。研究结果表明,在模糊需求环境下,供应链系统中依然存在“双重边际化”效应,通过在协调机制中改变契约系数可以使供应链各成员的期望利润相比分散决策时有明显提高,并且当谈判双方达成纳什谈判解时,成员在收益共享契约下的期望利润等于其在回购契约下的期望利润。

关键词: 供应链, 协调机制, 收益共享, 回购契约, 模糊需求, 可信性分布

Abstract: To guarantee profit for supply chain memebers, in a two-stage supply chain composed of one supplier and one retailer, the supply chain coordination mechanism was studied under a fuzzy demand environment. The market demand was considered as a fuzzy variable. Models of decentralized decision, centralized decision, revenue sharing contract and return contract under uncertain theory were constructed based on credibility distribution. Triangular fuzzy variable was used to optimize these models and their optimal policies were also presented. Finally, numerical example was applied to resolve parameters in these models, and analysis results were also verified. Under a fuzzy demand environment, it was revealed that the double marginalization effect still existed. In supply chain coordination mechanism, the expected profit of the members could be improved remarkably compared to in decentralized decision by changing contract coefficient. In addition, the expected profits for each member in revenue sharing contract were equaled to that in return contract when Nash-bargaining solution was reached.

Key words: supply chain, coordination mechanism, revenue sharing, return contract, fuzzy demand, credibility distribution

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