关键词: 供应链, 激励, 棘轮效应, 多阶段, 不对称信息

Abstract: To study incentive scheme under asymmetric information of the supplier's cost efficiency parameter and of its effort level parameter in a retailer-led supply chain, a method under a principal-Agent model and revelation principle was proposed. In this method, static incentive contract was established. Main results revealed that the static incentive contract established an incentive policy in one-period scheme to maximized retailers profit which would motivate the supplier to give its real cost efficiency and to word hard; and that the static incentive contract could not work in multi-period because of the ratchet effect： doing more now reduces future rewards, under this circumstance, “Allowance Agreement” was proposed to deal with such ratchet effect.

Key words: supply chain, incentive, ratchet effect, multi-period, asymmetric information, allowance agreement