• 论文 •    

基于斯坦克尔伯格博弈的订货提前期决策研究

刘蕾, 罗华, 唐小我   

  1. 1.电子科技大学 管理学院管理科学与电子商务系, 四川成都610054;2.四川大学 制造科学与工程学院,四川成都610065
  • 出版日期:2007-07-15 发布日期:2007-07-25

Ordering lead time decision based on Stackelberg game

LIU Lei, LUO Hua, TANG Xiao-wo   

  1. 1.Department of Management Science & E-Commerce, School of Management, University of Electronic Science & Technology of China, Chengdu610054,China; 2.School of Manufacturing Science & Engineering, Sichuan University,Chengdu610065, China
  • Online:2007-07-15 Published:2007-07-25

摘要: 研究了供应链中供应商和零售商两级间的订货提前期决策问题。考虑现实中常见而研究较少的供应商决定交货时间和零售商决定订货量的订货过程,在提前期管理成本由上下游分担的条件下,建立了基于斯坦克尔伯格博弈的订货提前期模型,对比分析了供应商先动和零售商先动情形下的提前期和订货批量决策,说明了先行公布提前期对降低供应商成本和缩短供应链中的提前期是有利的。最后,通过算例对模型和结论进行了验证。

关键词: 提前期, 供应链, 斯坦克尔伯格博弈, 库存成本

Abstract: Ordering lead time decision between two-level of supplier and retailer in a supply chain was studied. The popular ordering process with few studies in which supplier decided ordering lead time and retailer decided order quantity was taken into consideration. On condition that lead time cost was shared by upstream and downstream, ordering lead time model based on Stackelberg game was constructed. Lead time and order quantity decision under supplier first and retailer first conditions were compared and analyzed. It was showed that the supplier as the leader could reduce the lead time and the supplier's cost. An calculation example was given to verify and illustrate the models and conclusions.

Key words: lead time, supply chain, Stackelberg game, inventory cost

中图分类号: