计算机集成制造系统 ›› 2023, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (4): 1097-1106.DOI: 10.13196/j.cims.2023.04.004

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关键设备维修能力决策竞合博弈模型及仿真

秦绪伟,兰峰,刘晓冉,蒋忠中   

  1. 东北大学工商管理学院
  • 出版日期:2023-04-30 发布日期:2023-05-16
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(72071037,71971052,71871038),中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(N2106010)。

Biform game modeling and simulating for repair capacity decision of mission-critical equipment

QIN Xuwei,LAN Feng,LIU Xiaoran,JIANG Zhongzhong   

  1. School of Business Administration,Northeastern University
  • Online:2023-04-30 Published:2023-05-16
  • Supported by:
    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation,China(No.72071037,71971052,71871038),and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,China(No.N2106010).

摘要: 关键设备维修技术复杂性决定运营商需要长提前期向维修服务供应商预订服务能力,而运营商又面临短期维修需求不确定且与同类运营商竞争预订能力等问题,导致预订服务能力与实际需求不匹配难题。考虑工业互联网平台服务市场便利合作共享的新契机,以竞合博弈理论为建模框架研究多个运营商的维修能力预订与执行两阶段决策方法:在合作阶段解决多个运营商的执行能力最优分配;在竞争阶段建立运营商独立竞相预订决策方法,证明预订能力纳什均衡解的存在性与唯一性。以集中决策作为基准,探讨单个运营商预订过剩、不足与恰好3类情景下预订能力纳什均衡解与最优解之间间隙及内在根源。理论与仿真结果证实竞合博弈决策情景下运营商利润可达到最优;运营商的预订能力在集中与竞合博弈情景下决策均优于独立决策。竞合博弈方法为平台服务市场中关键设备维修能力配置难题提供了有效、多方共赢的解决方法。

关键词: 关键设备, 维修能力, 竞合博弈, 服务平台

Abstract: The technical complexity requires the operator to reserve the supplier's repair capacity during longer lead time.However,the operator must face to the challenge of uncertainty of repair demand in short period,and cope with the competition from other operator using similar equipment,which lead to a mismatch between actual repair demand and reserved capacity.Considering the new opportunity for sharing the supplier's repair capacity reserved among cooperative operators in industrial internet platform,the repair capacity reservation was studied by taking the biform game theory as the modeling framework,and a two-stage decision method was executed.In cooperation stage,the optimal allocation of multiple operators' execution abilities was solved;in competitive stage,the independent competitive decision method of operators was constructed to prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash-equilibrium solution for reservation capacity.Compared with optimal solutions of reservation and allocation of repair capacity,the equilibrium solutions were investigated in three scenarios with the excess,insufficient and exact reservation,then reason of the gap was presented.The theoretical analysis and simulative results confirmed that the profit of operator could achieve the first-best level and that reserved capacity decisions in biform game and centralized optimization all outperform that of the operator by oneself.As a result,the proposed modeling of biform game could provide an effective method to solve this inherent difficulty and achieve a win-win situation in the service platform.

Key words: mission-critical equipment, repair capacity, biform game, service platform

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