第三方平台监管下的多价值链成员交易行为演化模型及仿真分析

doi:10.13196/j.cims.2021.11.022

计算机集成制造系统 ›› 2021, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (11): 3291-3304.DOI: 10.13196/j.cims.2021.11.022

第三方平台监管下的多价值链成员交易行为演化模型及仿真分析

但斌^1,2,胡祯洁^1,2,李文博^1,2,眭蓉华^1,2

1.重庆大学经济与工商管理学院
2.重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室

出版日期:2021-11-30 发布日期:2021-11-30
基金资助:
国家重点研发计划资助项目(2018YFB1701502);国家自然科学基金资助项目(72072016);重庆市研究生科研创新资助项目（CYS20053）;中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(2019CDCGJG332)。

Evolution game model and simulation analysis of multi-value chain members' transaction behavior under supervision of third-party platforms

Online:2021-11-30 Published:2021-11-30
Supported by:
Project supported by the National Key Research and Development Program,China(No.2018YFB1701502),the National Natural Science Foundation,China(No.72072016),the Graduate Scientific Research and Innovation Foundation of Chongqing Municipality,China(No.CYS20053),and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,China(No.2019CDCGJG332).

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 针对多价值链成员在不确定市场需求下的交易失信问题,基于第三方平台监管,构建了制造商和供应商间的演化博弈模型,分析了双方交易行为决策的动态演化机理和相互关系,并讨论了平台不同监管惩罚策略下制造商和供应商的长期交易策略。通过进一步仿真分析验证了平台监管力度、损失赔偿比例、市场需求、库存损失和缺货损失对双方交易行为演化路径的影响。结果表明：制造商和供应商的行为决策受多重因素影响,加大平台的监管惩罚力度,能够逐步提高制造商采用诚信行为和供应商采用守信行为策略的概率;平台可以通过对制造商收取较高的罚金达到约束供需双方行为、激励双方诚信交易的目的。

关键词: 第三方平台, 平台监管, 多价值链, 交易行为, 演化博弈

Abstract: To solve the problem of untrustworthy transactions of members in multiple value chains under uncertain demands,a dynamic game model composed of manufacturers and suppliers was constructed by considering the supervision of third-party platform.The transactions between manufacturers and suppliers were analyzed.The dynamic evolution mechanism of behavioral decision-making and the interrelationship between strategic choices were discussed,as well as the long-term trading strategies of manufacturers and suppliers under different supervision and punishment strategies of the platform.The influence of platform supervision,loss compensation ratio,market demand,inventory loss and stock-out loss on the evolution path of multi-value chain members' transaction behavior was verified with simulation analysis.The results showed that the behavioral decisions of manufacturers and suppliers were affected by multiple factors.The platform could gradually increase the probability that manufacturers adopt honest behavior strategies and suppliers adopt trustworthy strategies by increasing the supervision and punishment on manufacturers and suppliers.The platform could restrain both parties transaction behaviors by charging a higher fine to the manufacturer and incentivizing both manufacturers and suppliers to conduct honest transactions.

Key words: third-party platform, platform supervision, multiple value chains, transaction behavior, evolutionary game

中图分类号:

F724.6

但斌,胡祯洁,李文博,眭蓉华. 第三方平台监管下的多价值链成员交易行为演化模型及仿真分析[J]. 计算机集成制造系统, 2021, 27(11): 3291-3304.

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第三方平台监管下的多价值链成员交易行为演化模型及仿真分析

Evolution game model and simulation analysis of multi-value chain members' transaction behavior under supervision of third-party platforms

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