Abstract: Crowdsourcing as an innovative model based on digital platform is becoming the focus of attention today.However,there are very few researches on how to incentivize crowdsourcing innovators from the perspective of the life-cycle of crowdsourcing products.For this reason,a sequential joint reward mechanism was designed to study the role of the sequential joint reward mechanism at different stages of the crowdsourcing product life cycle.It combined crowdsourced design quality and product price decision-making to explore and compare the effects of different reward mechanisms on crowdsourcing enterprises and innovators in a competitive context.Research had found that the price changes of crowdsourcing products under a pure pre-reward mechanism exhibited an 'Inverted S'shape with drastic price changes,while the sequential joint reward mechanism showed a gradually decreasing trend in price changes.In the early stages of growth,a higher proportion of pre-reward leaded to a surge in profits,but in the middle and later stages of growth and maturity,a higher proportion of pre-reward actually hindered the increase in profits.In addition,under the sequential joint reward mechanism,the threshold sales of crowdsourcing enterprises should be delayed in the early and middle stages of the growth stage of crowdsourcing products,facilitating to motivate crowdsourcing designers to continuously improve follow-up and optimize the design.

Key words: crowdsourced innovation, design quality, sequential joint reward, life cycle, growth period

摘要： “众包”作为一种基于“数字化”平台的创新模式,正成为当今关注的焦点,但如何从众包产品寿命周期视角对众包创新者进行连续激励研究极少。通过设计出“序贯联合奖励机制”——即“事前事后奖励机制”,来研究在众包产品寿命周期不同阶段下序贯联合奖励机制的作用,将众包设计质量和众包产品价格决策结合起来,探讨和比较在市场竞争背景下,不同奖励机制对众包企业和众包创新者的效果。研究发现,在单纯“事前奖励机制”下的众包产品价格变化呈现出“反S”形,价格变化剧烈,而“序贯联合奖励机制”则价格变化表现为逐渐下降趋势;并且在成长阶段的早期,较高“事前奖励”使得早期的利润激增,但成长阶段的中后期以及成熟阶段,较高的“事前奖励”比例反而妨碍利润的增加;另外,在序贯联合奖励机制下,发现众包企业门槛销量延后至众包产品“成长阶段的早中期”设置,则更利于激励众包设计者持续改进后续和优化原先设计。

关键词: 众包创新, 设计质量, 序贯联合奖励, 寿命周期, 成长期