Abstract: The buyback contract with stochastic prices caused by emergencies can whether coordinate the supply chain or not under two-way information asymmetry was studied.An information incentive model of buyback contract with two-way information asymmetry was constructed by combining dAspromont & Gerard Varet (AGV) mechanism with buyback contract.A new kind of transfer payment in hope of ensuring the expected return of both sides was designed,as well as a set of buyback contract menu.The simulation examples were used to verify the validity and rationality of the model.The results showed that the optimal transaction volume of goods was decreased with increasing of cost information between the supplier and the seller under two-way information asymmetry.The transfer payment obtained by seller was decreased with rising cost and increased with rising cost of the supplier,while the transfer payment obtained by the supplier was increased with rising cost and decreased with rising cost of the seller.The profits of both suppliers and sellers were very close to each other under complete information symmetry.Buyback contract could coordinate supply chains with two-way information asymmetry.

Key words: stochastic price, two-way information asymmetry, buyback contract, transfer payment, supply chain coordination

摘要： 为了解决突发事件导致价格随机的回购契约在双向信息不对称的条件下是否还能协调供应链的问题,将AGV(dAspremont & Gerard-Varet)机制和回购契约相结合,构建双向信息不对称下的回购契约信息激励模型,设计了一种新的转移支付以保证供销双方的期望收益,并设计出一组回购契约菜单。通过仿真算例证实了模型的有效性和合理性。结果表明:双向信息不对称时,商品最优交易量随着供销双方成本信息的增加而减小,销售商获得的转移支付随着其成本的增大而减小,随供应商成本的增大而增大。供应商获得的转移支付随着其成本的增大而增大,随销售商成本的增大而减小。信息完全对称时,供销双方的事前与事后收益非常接近。回购契约能够协调具有双向信息不对称的供应链。

关键词: 价格随机, 双向信息不对称, 回购契约, 转移支付, 供应链协调