›› 2021, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (7): 2095-2111.DOI: 10.13196/j.cims.2021.07.023

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Differential game analysis on remanufacturing with government regulation and supply chain coordination

  

  • Online:2021-07-31 Published:2021-07-31
  • Supported by:
    Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation,China(No.71874159,71371169,71601169),and the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province,China(No.LY18G020020).

考虑政府规制和供应链协调的再制造微分博弈模型

张雪梅1,2,周根贵1,曹柬1+   

  1. 1.浙江工业大学管理学院
    2.浙江工业大学机械工程学院
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71874159,71371169,71601169);浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LY18G020020)。

Abstract: Remanufacturing strategies with dynamic characteristics are affected by government regulations and supply chain factors.To promote sustainable development of the remanufacturing supply chain,a dynamic game model consisting of one leading manufacturer and a following retailer was introduced to investigate the role of government regulation and supply chain coordination on remanufacturing.The pricing decisions for the new and remanufactured products,as well as the remanufacturing performance were discussed under three scenarios that were no government regulation without supply chain coordination,government regulation without supply chain coordination and government regulation with supply chain coordination.Analytical results indicated that government regulation facilitated manufacturers to remanufacture and supply chain coordination contract further enhanced market forces and government power.The cost-sharing contract had a paramount role in invigorating the retailer to advertise products and brands,promoting goodwill level of both firms.Under certain conditions,the cost-sharing contract could realize to improve benefits of the manufacturer and retailer as well as the whole supply chain system.The results were of significant references for remanufacturing-related firms and government in coordinative remanufacturing operations and governmental policy makings respectively.

Key words: remanufacturing, government regulation, supply chain coordination, cost sharing, differential game

摘要: 现实中企业再制造决策往往受到政府规制和供应链因素的影响,且具有动态变化的特征。为推进再制造供应链的可持续运营,考虑政府规制和供应链协调作用,构建由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的再制造供应链微分博弈模型,分别探讨无政府规制无供应链协调、有政府规制无供应链协调、有政府规制有供应链协调3种情形下新产品和再制品的定价决策及再制造供应链绩效水平。研究发现,政府规制有利于激励制造商积极参与废旧产品的回收再制造活动,而供应链协调契约可以进一步提升消费市场作用并促进政府政策的实施;制造商利用成本分担契约激励零售商进行产品和企业品牌宣传,可有效提高企业商誉水平;在一定条件下,该成本分担契约可以有效实现制造商、零售商和整个供应链系统效益的改进。研究结论对再制造供应链节点间的协调合作以及政府规制政策的制定具有一定的参考价值。

关键词: 再制造, 政府规制, 供应链协调, 成本分担, 微分博弈

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