Computer Integrated Manufacturing System ›› 2024, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (1): 379-395.DOI: 10.13196/j.cims.2022.0673

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Screening models of dual-channel supply chain under demand information asymmetry

HU Xiaoqing1,2,CAI Jianhu1,2+,SUN Haining1,2,MA Xiangyuan2,JIA Lishuang1,2   

  1. 1.Experimental Center of Data Science and Intelligent Decision-Making,Hangzhou Dianzi University
    2.School of Management,Hangzhou Dianzi University
  • Online:2024-01-31 Published:2024-02-05
  • Supported by:
    Project supported by the Key Project of Zhejiang Provincial Philosophy and Social Science Planning,China(No.24NDQN01Z),the National Natural Science Foundation,China(No.71972171,72202052),the Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province,China(No.LQ22G020012),and the National Social Science Foundation,China(No.22BGL305).

需求信息不对称背景下双渠道供应链信息甄别模型

胡晓青1,2,蔡建湖1,2+,孙海宁1,2,马香媛2,贾利爽1,2   

  1. 1.杭州电子科技大学数据科学与智能决策实验中心
    2.杭州电子科技大学管理学院
  • 基金资助:
    浙江省哲学社会科学规划重点课题资助项目(24NDQN01Z);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71972171,72202052);浙江省自然科学基金资助项目(LQ22G020012);国家社会科学基金资助项目(22BGL305)。

Abstract: An increasing number of manufacturers actively acquire demand information through various ways like market investigation.Specially,in a dual-channel supply chain,manufacturers sell products directly to consumers through their own channels ,then they possess a large amount of sales data,which can support their demand prediction.By considering the situation that the manufacturer possessed private demand information,a dual-channel supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer was constructed.The information screening models were developed based on the two-part tariff contract and the quality encouragement contract,and the optimal contract design scheme was derived to realize demand information sharing in the dual-channel supply chain.By comparing the members' equilibrium solutions and ex-ante expected profits,the validity of two contracts was analyzed,and the impact of demand information asymmetry on the supply chain was discussed.The result showed that,compared with the information symmetry,it was not conducive to the improvement of product quality when the manufacturer possessed private demand information.However,under demand information asymmetry,the wholesale price was lowered.In general,the manufacturer could obtain information rent besides the reserved profit by possessing private demand information.Under specific conditions,the retailer could also acquire more ex-ante expected profit under information asymmetry than that under information symmetry.Therefore,it was possible for the dual-channel supply chain to perform better under demand information asymmetry.

Key words: demand information asymmetry, dual-channel supply chain, information screening, product quality

摘要: 越来越多的制造商主动通过市场调研等途径来获取需求信息。特别是在双渠道供应链中,制造商通过直销渠道将产品销售给消费者,获得了大量销售数据,为其需求预测提供有力支撑。鉴于此,考虑制造商拥有私有需求信息的实际情况,构建由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链,分别基于两部定价契约和质量激励契约来构建信息甄别模型,研究实现制造商需求信息共享的最优契约方案。进一步通过对比双渠道供应链成员的均衡决策和事前期望利润,讨论了两种契约方案的效率,以及需求信息不对称对双渠道供应链产生的影响。研究表明,制造商掌握私有需求信息不利于提高产品质量水平,但产品的批发价格小于信息对称时的批发价格。需求信息不对称下,制造商在获得保留利润的同时能够获得信息租金,而零售商也能够通过合理的契约方案设计,在一定条件下获得比信息对称时更高的事前期望利润。因此,满足一定条件,双渠道供应链的性能在需求信息不对称时相对于需求信息对称时更优。

关键词: 需求信息不对称, 双渠道供应链, 信息甄别, 产品质量

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