Abstract: Aiming at the optimal decision problem of a closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)consisted of a manufacturer and two competing retailers in the case of emergencies,the coping strategy and coordination mechanism based on "revenue-cost sharing" contract were presented.The revenue-cost sharing contract was verified to realize coordination of closed-loop supply chain in the stable market condition.When the market and remanufacturing cost were disrupted by emergencies simultaneously,a game model was established and solved to obtain the optimal coping strategy of emergency for centralized CLSC,and the coordination of adjust revenue-cost sharing contract to decentralized CLSC under emergencies was further validated.The effectiveness of proposed model was verified by numerical analysis.

Key words: closed-loop supply chain, emergencies, disturbance factors, revenue-cost sharing, game theory

摘要： 针对一个制造商和两个竞争零售商组成的闭环供应链在突发事件下的最优决策问题,提出一种基于“收益共享-费用共担”契约的应对策略和协调机制。在稳定的市场条件下验证了“收益共享-费用共担”契约能够实现闭环供应链的协调。当突发事件导致市场规模和再制造成本同时发生扰动时,通过建立和求解扰动环境下的博弈模型,提出闭环供应链在集中化决策时应对突发事件的最优策略,并进一步验证了调整后的 “收益共享-费用共担” 契约对协调突发事件下分散化决策闭环供应链的协调作用。通过数值分析验证了模型的有效性。

关键词: 闭环供应链, 突发事件, 扰动因素, 收益共享-费用共担, 博弈论