• 论文 •    

价格弹性需求下基于最小订购量的契约及供应链收益分析

丁平1,祁玉青2,闵杰3   

  1. 1.合肥工业大学 管理学院,安徽合肥230009;2.中国科学技术大学 管理学院,安徽合肥230026;3.安徽建筑大学 数理系,安徽合肥230022
  • 收稿日期:2013-04-25 修回日期:2013-04-25 出版日期:2013-04-25 发布日期:2013-04-25

Minimum order quantity contract and its impact on the revenue of supply chain under price-sensitive demand

DING Ping1, QI Yu-qing2, MIN Jie3   

  1. 1.School of Management,Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China;2.School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230029, China;3.Department of Mathematical Science, Anhui University of Architecture, Hefei 230022, China
  • Received:2013-04-25 Revised:2013-04-25 Online:2013-04-25 Published:2013-04-25

摘要: 针对由单个制造商和多个销售商组成的两级供应链,基于价格弹性需求,研究最小订购量契约的设定方法及其对供应链各方收益造成的影响。发现在最小订购量契约下,销售商的最优订购策略为一种分段函数的形式。在此基础上,设计了一种精确求解最优最小订购量的算法,并给出了最小订购量契约下制造商收益变化的上界以及整个供应链收益变化的下界。

关键词: 价格弹性需求, 供应链契约, 最小订购量, Stackelberg博弈

Abstract: Based on a two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and multiple retailers, the design of Minimum Order Quantity (MOQ) contract and its impacts on the profits of supply chain members under price-sensitive demand were investigated. Theoretic analyses demonstrated that the optimal order policy of retailers was a piecewise function under the MOQ contract. An exact algorithm was designed to find the optimal MOQ contract. The upper bound of the manufactures'profit and the lower bound of total profit of the supply chain under MOQ contract were also provided.

Key words: price-sensitive demand, supply chain contract, minimum order quantity, Stackelberg game

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